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Abstract—There is no secrecy without randomness, and we
address poor cloud security using an analogue chaotic one-
time pad encryption system to achieve perfect secrecy. Local
encoding returns control to the client and makes stored cloud data
unreadable to an adversary. Most cloud service providers encode
client data using public encryption algorithms, but ultimately
businesses and organisations are responsible for encoding data
locally before uploading to the Cloud. As recommended by the
Cloud Security Alliance, companies employing authentication
and local encryption will reduce or eliminate, EU fines for late
data breach discoveries when the EU implements the new general
data protection regulations in 2018. Companies failing to detect
data breaches within a 72-hour limit will be fined up to four
percent of their global annual turnover and estimates of several
hundred billion euros could be levied in fines based on the present
146 days average EU breach discovery. The proposed localised
encryption system is additional to public encryption, and obeying
the rules of one-time pad encryption will mean intercepted
encrypted data will be meaningless to an adversary. Furthermore,
the encoder has no key distribution problem because applications
for it are of “one-to-cloud” type.
Keywords—Secrecy; Local encryption; GDPR fines; one-time
pad; one-to-cloud; key distribution problem; chaos.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper builds on the conference paper presented at
the IARIA cloud conference in Athens, Greece, February
2017, and includes new test results and concepts not included
previously because of page number limitations [1]. Existing
poor security of sensitive data stored in the cloud is addressed
by introducing local encoding by the client. A One-Time-Pad
(OTP) encryption system returns control to the client by adding
an extra encoding layer of security over public encryption
and makes encoded data unreadable to any adversary who
gains access to a server. In May 2018, the EU introduces
the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) which will
penalise companies and organisations for late data breach
discoveries more than the proposed 72-hour limit [2]. Fines up
to four percent of the global annual turnover of EU and UK
companies and institutions, are estimated at several hundred
billion euros each year and potentially could result in some of
them ceasing operation. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA)
recommends organisations should employ authentication and
local encryption to protect against data breaches, and GDPR
Articles 32 and 34 state why local encryption by the client will
mitigate against punitive fines [3]. A two-pronged solution for
inadequate cloud security and EU fines was proposed in a
paper [4], where local encryption, immutable databases, and
audit trail accountability, was discussed.
In this paper, we discuss further aspects of the OTP en-
cryption system which incorporates analogue chaos oscillator
sources initialised by electronic noise. For the OTP encoder,
we suggest “One-To-Cloud” (OTC) applications for protecting
client confidentiality, where there are no Key Distribution
Problems (KDP) because the client retains the OTP key.
Eliminating side-channel attacks and other less sophisticated
hacking methods is not possible, irrespective of this encoding
system, or that provided by the Cloud Service Providers (CSP).
However, our system will make data unreadable for adversaries
who do not possess the OTP key.
The paper layout is as follows: Section I introduces the
concept of local encryption and OTC applications showing
how it protects client data and addresses the proposed GDPR
fines for late data breach discoveries. In Section II, security
in the Cloud explains why local encryption will solve specific
security problems. In Section III, a brief OTP history illustrates
how it secured successfully, intergovernmental communica-
tions between British and American leaders in WWII, and
protected world peace during the cold war period. Discussed
briefly is the structure of the OTP encoder and why it is a true
source of entropy.
In Section IV, modern OTP applications explain why the
chaos encoder protects client confidentiality and does so with
no KDP. Section V introduces chaos cryptography and de-
scribes the design of the OTP prototype comprising analogue
chaos oscillators initialised with electronic noise. In Section
VI, we outline a range of statistical tests carried out on the
encryption prototype to ensure it meets international standards
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for randomness. Conclusion and future work are given in
Section VII, and the Appendix contains figures to illustrate
specific points in the paper.
II. SECURITY IN THE CLOUD
Cloud computing has many advantages, and managing
information from any location is critical for efficient business
operation [5][6]. However, clients are seeing cloud server
attacks reported daily in the media and is causing a drop in
confidence in cloud security [7]. Furthermore, these clients
do not know if their data is encrypted by the CSP, or where
it is stored, but encoded data should have:
• Integrity: Detecting unwanted modification by an adver-
sary,
• Confidentiality: Ensures authorised only users can access
stored information,
• Authentication: Guarantees the client identity and the
validity of stored data,
• Availability: Ensures client data can be accessed at all
times, and,
• Accountability: An audit trail which encompasses non-
repudiation, intrusion detection and prevention.
Compounding poor cloud security is the possibility of
backdoors in public encryption as suggested by Shumow and
Ferguson in a 2007 presentation [8][9][10]. In 2013, Edward
Snowden alleged backdoors were placed in public encryption
systems by the National Security Agency (NSA) [11]. That
said, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm used
in cloud security, is probably secure, but nobody knows what
other weaknesses exist in public encryption. Backdoors and
the threat of GDPR fines for late reporting of data breaches,
strengthen our argument for an extra layer of localised security
using an OTP random binary number generator.
A. Localised cloud security
Localised OTP encryption for data uploaded to the cloud
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), addresses poor security
issues. Security breaches in the Cloud are rarely discovered
and reported instantly, and many months elapse before dis-
covery [12]. Although the time for detecting these breaches
has been reduced, the global average is still 146 days [3]. In
May 2018, the EU GDPR will replace the Data Protection
Directive 95/46/ec, where it states that mandatory breach
notification must be reported within 72 hours. Companies and
organisations failing to meet this will be fined up to four
percent of their global annual turnover [13].
Article 32 of the regulations deals with security of personal
data and states, “. . . controller, and the processor shall im-
plement appropriate technical and organisational measures to
ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including the
pseudonymization and encryption of personal data”. Article
34 states for any company “. . . has implemented appropriate
technical and organisational protection measures . . . such as
encryption”, may avoid punitive breach fines. Apart from
these two articles, the regulations cover little on encryption
standards, but it appears to encourage companies to use local
encryption. Interestingly, GDPR will apply to UK businesses
post-Brexit.
Inadequate security in the Cloud is now a primary concern
amongst cloud users because commercially-available encryp-
tion algorithms are not protecting stored data. The proposed
hardware-based OTP random binary number generator en-
codes data locally by the client before uploading to the
Cloud and makes data unreadable if intercepted. The encoder
produces random binary sequences digits by thresholding
the signal output from two analogue chaos oscillators, and
software post-processing of the OTP binary stream ensures
sequences from the interleaved chaos source are unbiased and
statistically independent from each other.
III. ONE-TIME PAD ENCRYPTION
A patent granted in 1917 for an OTP encryption system
by Joseph Mauborgne and Gilbert Vernam, was not the first
of its kind, however, because Dr Steven Bellovin discovered
telegrams were encoded using OTPs many years before this.
In an 1882 book, “Telegraphic Code to Insure Privacy and
Secrecy in the Transmission of Telegrams”, Frank Miller
describes how OTPs could protect telegrams [14][15]. There is
no record to show whether Miller, a successful banker, actually
made an OTP generator prototype.
Modern encryption is not protecting sensitive data in the
Cloud, as is evidenced by the fact that most of the greatest
security agencies have been hacked, and so a new approach
using the concept of OTP encryption is considered. Some
cryptologists argue the OTP has no place in modern encryption
because of the KDP and the large size of the OTP. However,
we make the case that with modern electronics and specific
applications, and the fact that it is unbreakable, makes the OTP
a viable encryption method for protecting sensitive material in
the Cloud.
A. Key distribution problem
The OTP is a symmetric encryption method that uses the
same key for encoding and decoding but creates a KDP. Two
solutions to this are: (i) Use the courier Sneakernet method
of carrying the key between two people, or (ii) choose OTC
applications which have no key sharing. The latter point is the
focus of this paper where only one person is involved with
no KDP. What we are not suggesting is to use the OTP for
day-to-day Internet transactions, such as email, etc., but only
for encoding sensitive data requiring extra security measures.
The OTP is unbreakable provided it is used only once, is
truly random, and is the same length as the data (plaintext).
However, computer memory is inexpensive, so this latter point
is no longer valid.
B. One-time pad history
Clarke and Turing worked in Bell Labs and were part of
a team which created the 55-tonne SIGSALY encryption sys-
tem for protecting conversations between Winston Churchill
and Franklin Roosevelt between 1942-1946 [16]. Messages
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encrypted with this method were wholly secure, but the system
had a KDP because noise (OTP) from a vacuum tube recorded
on a vinyl record was flown across the Atlantic. Another OTP
application was the famous “hotline” used during the Cuban
crisis by the Russian and American governments in the 60s.
Protecting information from interception by adversaries
dates back many thousands of years. The WWII German four-
rotor Enigma encoder with 10113 permutations, is perhaps, the
most famous encryption system and would still need a year of
modern computing power to decode messages. A Polish secret
service cryptanalyst, Marian Rejewski, knew wiring details of
the first rotor which reduced the possible permutations slightly.
He passed this information to the staff in Bletchley Park to
help decode German radio messages, but in reality, the German
Enigma operators made significant operating mistakes and was
a more substantial factor for decoding the messages [17][18].
C. Rules for OTP encoding
One-to-one OTP encoding systems had a KDP and operator
security problems which consigned the OTP to history and
was replaced by symmetric block ciphers and asymmetrical
public key algorithms [19][20]. The Soviet Intelligence used
OTP encryption because of its excellent record of protecting
data and distributed massive quantities of OTP keys during
WW11. However, human operators distributed more than two
copies of the same key - a significant factor which helped the
United States and British intelligence who created the Venona
project, to break the Soviet OTP code during this period and
later during the cold war period.
Encryption algorithms and devices should adhere to the
Kerckhoff-Shannon Principle, ‘A cryptosystem should be se-
cure if everything about the system except the key, is public
knowledge’, or, as Claude Shannon stated, The enemy knows
the system, now known as Shannon’s maxim [21]. Thus, an
encoding system should never rely on the complexity of the
encoder for secrecy and should obey the encoding algorithm
operating rules to remain secret.
IV. MODERN ONE-TO CLOUD OTP APPLICATIONS
The OTP is making a comeback [22][23][24], and we
propose OTC applications which have no KDP because the
client carries the OTP key to decode data from the Cloud at
other locations [25]. Figure 1 shows the first OTP encoder-
decoding process for OTC applications which generates ran-
dom binary sequences stored in an air-gapped computer (i.e.,
not connected to the Internet), or on a flash drive.
FIGURE 1. OTP ONE-TO-CLOUD ENCODING APPLICATION WITH NO KDP.
The client uses software, which exclusively OR-gates the
OTP from the encryptor hardware with the plaintext data at
location one. At location two, software decodes the ciphertext
with the key.
A. OTP encryption and randomness
Claude Shannon described the OTP as “perfect secrecy”,
and is information-theoretic secure and mathematically un-
breakable even if using unlimited computing power. An OTP
must be truly random to protect the plaintext data from
ciphertext attack because an attacker cannot determine the
plaintext from the ciphertext without the key. Brute-force
searching the key space by an adversary will not help because
all messages are equally likely.
Figure 2 shows an Exclusive OR (EXOR) logic gate (7486)
which encrypts using modulo two, the message plaintext
string of bits with an OTP. The message, m ∈ {0, 1}n for
some n, is encoded with the secret key k ∈ {0, 1}n for
some n, and produces an output, Ek(m) = m ⊕ k. The
encryption function E maps the secret OTP key and the
plaintext message to a ciphertext, c ∈ {0, 1}n for some n
and is written, c = Ek(m). To recover the data a decoding
function, D, reverses this by mapping the key k and the
ciphertext, c, back to the plaintext message, m = Dk(c).
FIGURE 2. OTP ENCODING AND DECODING USING MODULO TWO
ADDITION.
The following OTP applications have no KDP:
• Academics uploading exam scripts for retrieval by office
staff.
• Making presentations about sensitive data away at differ-
ent locations.
• Medical and legal OTC applications discussed in [26] but
repeated here for completeness.
Advantages of OTC applications:
• Able to download secure data at many locations,
• Eliminates transporting of sensitive unencoded docu-
ments which could be lost in transit,
• Encrypting documents locally with an OTP prevents an
intruder from understanding intercepted data, and
• Avoids the punitive GDPR fines for late breach discovery.
B. Solution to the key distribution problem
The first application for solving the KDP is an OTC med-
ical example for encoding patient medical details displayed
on medical images. Transporting medical images from the
hospital to the doctor via post, or given to the patient, are
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insecure methods because data can be lost and compromises
patient confidentiality. A better method is to encode the images
and store them in the Cloud at the hospital. These can be
accessed by the doctor using the OTP key given to the patient
on a memory device such as a flash memory device or CD.
Figure 3 shows the proposed method for storing images.
FIGURE 3. ENCODING MEDICAL IMAGES USING OTP.
Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DI-
COM), is the international standard for distributing, processing
and storing medical images, where, for example, an MRI
image will display patient metadata on the image [27]. The
OTP encoding system encodes the images or the metadata, to
retain patient confidentiality [28]. Figure 4 for example, shows
an MRI head scan image which was requested by a doctor for
a patient with persistent headaches and high blood pressure.
The encoded MRI image in the middle pane was processed
using a JavaScript application interface written to process the
OTP with the image pixel data array. The third pane is the
image after processing with a deskewing algorithm described
in section V.
FIGURE 4. (A) DICOM MRI SCAN (B) ENCODED IMAGE (C) ENCODED
IMAGE WITH VN PROCESSING.
C. The paperless court case
The second example concerns encrypting documents locally
before a court case and introduces the concept of paperless
litigation.The system in Figure 5 is similar to AES encoding
used in [29] for protecting client confidentiality. At present,
legal staff carry court case documentation to court in ring
binders, and searching these files for case details in court
is inefficient, slow, and insecure. Introducing a much more
efficient data search mechanism in court is highly desirable
and is achievable with the proposed encoder system.
Encoding data and uploading to the Cloud before a court
case, creates a paperless environment, protects data and client
confidentiality, and also provides an efficient document search
mechanism. In court, the barrister downloads the encoded
court case data to an Android device and decodes it using
the OTP contained in a memory stick, which if lost, does not
create any security issues requiring only a new key.
FIGURE 5. PAPERLESS LITIGATION COURTROOM USING LOCAL
ENCRYPTION.
V. CHAOS CRYPTOGRAPHY
Confusion, diffusion and secrecy, are fundamental attributes
of an encryption system, and comparable properties exist in
chaos cryptographic systems. Claude Shannon in his 1949
paper [30], said data could be encoded by applying chaos
maps in a symmetric key encryption configuration. However,
Shannon’s paper did not create the same interest in chaos
cryptography, as did his 1945 information theory paper [31].
He discussed the relationship between chaos and cryptography
and compared ergodicity and mixing in chaos to cryptographic
confusion and Sensitivity to Initial Conditions (SIC) in chaos
to diffusion for small changes in the key [32][33]:
“Good mixing transformations are often formed by repeated
products of two simple non-commuting operations. Hopf has
shown, for example, that pastry dough can be mixed by such
a sequence of operations. The dough is first rolled out into a
thin slab, then folded over, then rolled, and then folded again,
etc. In good mixing, transformation functions are complicated,
involving all variables in a sensitive way. A small variation of
any one variable changes the outputs considerably”.
Expanding on these comparisons: Any small change in the
initial conditions will cause a chaos system to produce a
different trajectory within a short time, similarly in cryptogra-
phy, changing a small bit of the key will produce a different
ciphertext. Public-key cryptography was established in 1976
by W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, when “New Directions in
Cryptography” was published showing secret communication
was possible without transporting a secret key between sender
and receiver [34]. Many papers published on chaos cryptogra-
phy since 2000, demonstrated it was possible to encrypt data
using chaotic maps in a multi-algorithmic format, arranged on
a randomised block-by-block basis [35][36].
A. Chaos production and Dibit forming
Figure 6 presents an overview of the proposed encryption
system for generating OTP random bit streams from analogue
Chua and Lorenz chaos oscillators initialised by electronic
noise. The random bit stream encodes data locally before
storing in the Cloud [37]. OTP binary sequences were created
by interleaving the two uncorrelated independent data streams
from the Lorenz and Chua chaos sources to achieve alternate
bit independence. Pairs of bits called dibits, are processed by a
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FIGURE 6. OTP RANDOM BINARY NUMBER GENERATOR WITH CHAOS SOURCES INITIALISED WITH RECEIVER NOISE. DIBIT ARE FORMED IN
PREPARATION FOR THE VN ALGORITHM.
JavaScript interface through a Von Neumann (VN) algorithm.
This deskewing process removes any bias that might be
present and thus increases the sequence entropy. Using two
uncorrelated bit streams is often overlooked, and the VN
algorithm is incorrectly applied to a single data stream only.
The VN algorithm examines each dibit pair created and
rejects ‘00’ and ‘11’ whenever they occur. Similarly, dibit ‘01’
becomes ‘0’ and ‘10’ becomes ‘1’ [38]. In this manner, the
algorithm eliminates 75 percent of the data, but this just means
generating more bits.
The right bottom pane in Figure 4 shows the encoded image
processed with the VN but there is little discernible difference
between the two encoded images because bias was not present
in the OTP. Removing bias in encoded images is necessary
as it makes them susceptible to cryptanalysis; otherwise, the
encoded image will display patterns as shown in Figure 25 in
the appendix.
B. Authentication
The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) recommends companies
add a Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) SHA-256
function to the encrypted data to guard against breaches and
to check the integrity of the encrypted data [39]. HMAC is
a unique fixed-length function derived from the plaintext and
added to the ciphertext to verify the received encoded data
was not changed by a third-party. The hash output ensures
the clients identity is correct [40] and may be combined in
several ways with the encrypted message before being sent to
the Cloud.
Analogue chaos oscillator signals have infinitely many states
produced from a small number of independent variables, but
this is not true if created on a digital computer. Random binary
sequences from analogue chaos circuits initiated with natural
noise produce true random binary streams, which, in theory,
will have an infinite sequence length and generate excellent
keys.
Generating chaotic oscillations digitally on computers will
not produce true random binary sequences because finite
computer arithmetic will produce finite length sequences [41].
Similarly, random sequences from chaotic maps implemented
digitally will also have repeatable sequence lengths and thus
generate weaker keys [42].
Random binary streams produced from chaos sources on
digital computers are called pseudo-random sequences, have
a limited cycle length but are useful in many security appli-
cations.
C. The Lorenz chaos oscillator
Edward Lorenz was a meteorologist modelling weather
patterns in 1963, and during one of the modelling sessions,
he discovered SIC, one of the hallmarks of chaos systems.
To speed up the simulation he truncated model parameters
from five places of decimals to three and noticed it produced
different results from a previous simulation. He simplified
the original 1963 twelve equation model to three first-order
coupled equations in (1) [43].
x = −P ∫ t
t0
{x− y}dt
y = − ∫ t
t0
{−Rx+ y + 10xz}dt
z = − ∫ t
t0
{Bz − 10xy}dt
(1)
It was necessary to scale the Lorenz second equation by ten
(scale factor in bold type) to reduce signal amplitudes for
electronic devices (Figure 21 Appendix). Furthermore, the
equations were expressed in integral form because summing
inverting integrators were used to solve the equations as shown
in Figure 7. which was created and simulated using Cadence R©
OrCAD PSpice, v17.2.
PSpice connects parts of the circuit using net aliasing
(placing names on wires) rather than actual wires, and this
makes the schematic easier to read. The encoder source of
randomness is supplied by analogue Lorenz and Chua chaos
oscillators, both initialised by electronic noise whose ergodic
properties ensure the binary streams are cryptographically-
strong. Power supply decoupling components were not in-
cluded in the schematic, because decoupling components are
not modelled in PSpice and DC power supply lines were not
shown connected directly to integrated circuits but were given
alias names called POS and NEG. This simplified the circuit
for easier reading.
Lorenz used B = 2.666, P = 10, R = 28 defined oscillator
components: R1 = R2 = 100 kΩ, R3 = 36.3 kΩ, R4 = 10 kΩ,
R5 = 1 MΩ, R6 = 10 kΩ, R7 = 357 kΩ, and C = 330 pF. At
the testing stage, the Lorenz parameters were changed in the
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prototype to increase the OTP entropy as B = 2.8, P = 11, R
= 27.5.
Analogue Behavioural Model (ABM) parts were used ini-
tially for summation, multiplication and integration for quicker
simulation times and with fewer convergence problems (see
Figure 22 in the Appendix). However, these parts were re-
placed with actual model parts after a successful proof-of-
concept simulation, [44][45].
The four-quadrant AD633 multiplier integrated circuit (IC)
implemented the nonlinear cross-product terms, xy and xz,
such terms being necessary for chaos to exist. The general-
purpose quad operational amplifier integrated circuits (TL084),
were configured as inverting summing integrators to solve the
equations.
D. Thresholding the Lorenz chaos oscillator
The OTP is a sequence of random binary numbers produced
by converting the analogue chaos signal to binary. Maximum
entropy binary sequences were produced by thresholding the
(x) signal using a 1-bit analogue to digital converter (ADC)
circuit formed from two comparators (LM339) which pro-
duced digital pulses with varying widths. It was necessary
therefore to use two monostable devices to produce constant
width pulses. Selecting the Fixed Points (FP) of the attractor
as the suitable thresholding point on the chaos signal resulted
in binary sequences with maximum sequence entropy. It was
necessary to calculate the centre of these stable regions around
which the trajectory of the Lorenz x signal rotates to calculate
the threshold circuit values.
The set and reset pulse sequences from the two comparator
outputs are superimposing on the (x-y) strange attractor shown
in Figure 8. It can be seen how the pulse sequence trajectories
line up with the two centres (The set and reset signals are
shown in Figure 20 in the Appendix).
FIGURE 8. THE LORENZ STRANGE ATTRACTOR Z VS Xbias.
The loci centres are visited by the signal trajectory in a
random fashion and the FPs of (1), where one centre loci
represents a ‘1’, when the trajectory is near that region, and
a ‘0’ for the other centre. The threshold electronic circuit is
designed by determining the FPs at the centre of the strange
attractor by assuming the system is approximately linear at the
origin. These loci values are determined by equating to zero
the first-order in (1). For example, for x = y = z = 0, yields
dx
dt = 10(y − x) = 0 ⇒ x = y. Substituting this into the
second equation as dydt = 28x − x − xz = 0, yields z = 27.
Using this value, yields:
dz
dt
= x2 −Bz = 0⇒= ±
√
B(R− 1) (2)
The lobe centre coordinates, C1,2, are calculated:
C1,2 = {+
√
B(R− 1),−
√
B(R− 1), (R− 1)} (3)
Substituting the standard Lorenz yielded C1,2 =
{+8.48V,−8.48V, 27V }. It was necessary to magnitude
scale the equations by ten to reduce the signal voltage
amplitude suitable for electronic devices and this changed
the FPs to ± 0.8485 V (see Figure 21 in the appendix). A 4
V DC bias changed the bipolar X signal to polar form and
changed the upper and lower threshold levels to 3.15 V and
4.84, as shown in Figure 9.
FIGURE 9. THRESHOLDS SUPERIMPOSED ON THE BIASED X SIGNAL.
Threshold component values were determined by assuming
a total potentiometer value of 1 MΩ and a reference voltage
of 1.24 V (Vref). Substituting these values, and the threshold
values, into the following potential divider, produced values
for the three resistors:
V high = 4.84 V = V ref
R13 +R14 +R15
R15
(4)
Similarly,
V low = 3.15 V = V ref
R13 +R14 +R15
R14 +R15
(5)
The bias potential divider R8 and R9, shifts the x signal
up by 4 V and U1 is a unity gain amplifier IC to buffer
the biased signal. The threshold potentiometer values were
calculated: R13 = 607 kΩ, R14 = 138 kΩ and R15 = 256 kΩ.
The pair of LM339 comparators produce out-of-phase set and
reset pulse sequences with pulses of varying widths because
of the chaotic nature of the original signal. Hence, it was
necessary to make the pulse widths constant using monostable
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devices (74121). The new constant-width set and reset pulses
from the monostable were processed in an exclusive OR gate
(XOR) (7486) to generate a controlling clock stream.
This clock stream, and the reset pulse stream from the
top monostable, controlled when the OTP ’ones’ and ’zeroes’
were stored in Arduino memory for further processing in a
JavaScript application.
E. The time-delayed feedback Lorenz oscillator
Bit stream entropy was increased by adding a time delay,
τ , in the feedback path of the polar z signal in the Lorenz
oscillator and modified (1) to include the delay:
x(t) = −11 ∫ t
t0
{x(t)− y(t)}dt
y(t) = − ∫ t
t0
{−27.5x(t) + y(t) + x(t)z(t− τ)}dt
z(t) = − ∫ t
t0
{2.8z(t− τ)− x(t)y(t)}dt
(6)
Adding a delay τ in the feedback path was inspired by chaotic
maps such the logistic, He´non and Lozi, which have better
noise-like outputs and hence make better random number
generators, but are harder to implement electronically. The
normal method for introducing a delay is to use two sampling
switches, i.e., a sample and hold design, but is more complex
than the proposed analogue solution [46].
Figure 10 shows the analogue delay Pade´ approximation
circuit using a passive low-pass filter. The expression for the
z-transform in Digital Signal Processing (DSP), was used to
obtain values for the delay [47].
FIGURE 10. THE PADE´ DELAY CIRCUIT INCLUDED IN THE LORENZ AND
CHUA OSCILLATORS.
Compare the z-transform equation to the transfer function
for the analogue circuit:
z = esτ =
esτ/2
e−sτ/2
≈ 1 + sτ/2
1− sτ/2 (7)
The transfer function for the circuit in Figure 10, is:
Vout
Vin
= − sCdRd
1 + sCdRd
(8)
This gives an expression for the analogue delay, τ , in terms
of circuit component values and substituting component values
gives τ = 0.5*CdRd = 0.5 us. The delay circuit is connected
from the Z output via the feedback path to the input of the
third integrator. Figure 11 shows the 0.5 us delay introduced to
the Z signal, where Zd is the delayed signal. Chaos oscillator
initial conditions were obtained from a detuned 433 MHz data
FM receiver integrated circuit. Since the level of the receiver
noise is random, it means an intruder cannot predict where the
chaos sources start, and thus makes cryptanalysis impossible.
FIGURE 11. THE DELAY BETWEEN Z AND Zd IS 0.5 US
The receiver noise could be used as the primary source
but external signals from an attacker, could introduce regular
signals which would weaken the key.
F. The Chua chaotic oscillator
In 1983, while trying to prove the Lorenz oscillator was
chaotic, Leon Chua created a new analogue chaos oscillator
system defined by three first-order coupled equations as in
(9). The standard Chua oscillator configuration consisted of a
parallel-tuned type circuit and connected across it is a ’Chua
diode’composed of segmented negative resistances achieved
using operational amplifiers [48][49][50].
However, a simpler novel approach used two AD633 four-
quadrant multiplier devices to implement the cubic term in (9),
the term responsible for chaos [51]. An identical Pade´ delay
to the one used in the Lorenz circuit, was also added to the y
signal line to increase the signal entropy.
x(t) = − ∫ t
t0
{−1.66x(t)− 10y(t) + 0.625x(t)3}dt
y(t) = − ∫ t
t0
{−x(t) + y(t− τ)− z(t)}dt
z(t) = − ∫ t
t0
{14.286y(t)}dt
(9)
The Chua attractor and signals in Figure 12, are similar to
the Lorenz examined previously.
FIGURE 12. (A) THE CHUA ATTRACTOR ON THE LEFT (B) BOTTOM RIGHT
PANE ARE THE ANALOGUE SIGNALS WITH THE DIGITAL SIGNALS ON TOP.
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TABLE I. NIST RESULTS FOR THE COMPLETE OTP ENCODER (SHORT LENGTH OTP).
Statistical Test P-value natural noise P-value Lorenz and Chua (XOR) Pass/Fail
Frequency P = 0.4122 P = 0.6123 Pass
Block frequency P = 0.1161 P = 0.1008 Pass
Runs P = 0.7846 P = 0.0557 Pass
Block Longest Run Ones P = 0.5388 P = 0.5850 Pass
Binary Matrix Rank P = 0.7138 P = 0.4370 Pass
D Fourier Transform P = 0.5206 P = 0.6840 Pass
Overlapping Template Match P = 0.7729 P = 0.97144 Pass
Linear Complexity P = 0.952 P = 0.4699 Pass
Serial (P1 = 0.1971 P2 = 0.544) (P1 = 0.0831 P2 = 0.487) Pass
Approximate Entropy P = 0.1143 P = 0.0603 Pass
Cumulative Sums P = 0.4444 P = 0.6753 Pass
TABLE II. NIST RESULTS FOR THE COMPLETE ENCODER (LONG LENGTH OTP).
Random Excursion Test χ2 test P-value test Pass/Fail
(x =-4) χ2 = 3.7052 P = 0.5925 Pass
(x =-3) χ2 = 5.0654 P = 0.4079 Pass
(x =-2) χ2 = 2.1114 P = 0.8335 Pass
(x =-1) χ2 = 0.7659 P = 0.9791 Pass
(x = 1) χ2 = 1.5392 P = 0.9084 Pass
(x = 2) χ2 = 0.5213 P = 0.9913 Pass
(x = 3) χ2 = 2.2011 P = 0.8206 Pass
(x = 4) χ2 = 11.649 P = 0.0399 Pass
Random Excursion Variant Test Total visits P-value Pass/Fail
(x =-9) Total visits = 362 P = 0.0388 Pass
(x =-8) Total visits = 412 P = 0.0645 Pass
(x =-7) Total visits = 413 P = 0.0479 Pass
(x =-6) Total visits = 445 P = 0.0591 Pass
(x =-5) Total visits = 504 P = 0.1208 Pass
(x =-4) Total visits = 525 P = 0.1228 Pass
(x =-3) Total visits = 547 P = 0.1192 Pass
(x =-2) Total visits = 596 P = 0.2144 Pass
(x =-1) Total visits = 658 P = 0.6435 Pass
(x = 1) Total visits = 673 P = 0.9565 Pass
(x = 2) Total visits = 692 P = 0.7893 Pass
(x = 3) Total visits = 669 P = 0.9417 Pass
(x = 4) Total visits = 614 P = 0.5303 Pass
(x = 5) Total visits = 620 P = 0.6178 Pass
(x = 6) Total visits = 663 P = 0.9215 Pass
(x = 7) Total visits = 754 P = 0.5509 Pass
(x = 8) Total visits = 851 P = 0.2161 Pass
(x = 9) Total visits = 899 P = 0.1392 Pass
(x = 9) Total visits = 899 P = 0.1392 Pass
VI. TESTING THE RANDOMNESS OF THE ONE-TIME-PAD
It is impossible to say if a binary stream is random, but
statistical tests such as the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) suite of fifteen statistical tests (revised in
2010), can evaluate the cryptographic strength of the OTP
random number sequences (see Figure 26).
These NIST Statistical null hypothesis tests examine the
binary random bit stream to ascertain if the null hypothesis is
verified and entails exploring the p-values to see if they are
more significant than the significance level, 0.01 to 1. The test
also checks the numbers produced are uniformly distributed in
the interval 0:1 [52][53][54].
The NIST suite contains parameter tests to evaluate long
sequences of several million bits and non-parameter tests for
short sequences of 1000 bits. Table I shows NIST results for
short sequences for the encoder. Included in the first column,
for comparison purposes, are results from binary sequences
obtained from [55]. The NIST test results for long binary
sequences of several million bits are in Table II [56][57].
A. Additional randomness tests
Additional tests evaluated the entropy of the OTP for
correct certification:
• Autocorrelation,
• Power Spectral Density (PSD),
• Shannon entropy,
• Kolmogorov Sinai entropy and Algorithmic Complexity,
• Histogram distribution,
• Probability Distribution Function test,
• Lyapunov exponent test, and
• Averaging test
B. Autocorrelation Test
For truly random bit sequences, the autocorrelation function
test should display a Kronecker delta function over time. A
display showing other correlation peaks means the stream is
not truly random. The auto-correlation function for a digital
sequence is the cross-correlation of a signal, x(t) with a
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delayed version of itself, which, for intervals of r∆t, is:
[Rxx(r∆t) =
1
N − r
N−r∑
n=0
x(n)x(n+ r∆t) (10)
Polar binary sequences meaning positive w.r.t. zero, will
display a triangular shaped autocorrelation function rather than
an impulse. Hence, it is prudent to subtract the mean from the
series to obtain the correct impulse response shown in Figure
13 (Appendix Figure 23).
FIGURE 13. (A) THE OTP AUTOCORRELATION PLOT
C. Power Spectral Density
Spectral attacks by an adversary are possible if the Power
Spectral Density (PSD) for a key is not uniform. The PSD
is obtained from the absolute value of the square of the
magnitude of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). Alternatively,
apply the Wiener-Khinchine theorem to the FFT of the auto-
correlation function.
Sxf = limE
T→∞
 12T
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ T
−T
x(t)e−j2piftdt
∣∣∣∣∣
2
 (11)
Figure 14 displays Histogram and Power Spectral Density
plots of the Lena bitmap image encoded by an OTP in an XOR
gate. The PSD and histogram are uniform and no bias lines
are in the encoded picture. The decoded Lena image in the
bottom pane shows no visible degradation. Test suites such as
the ENT, TestU01, CryptX, Diehard, are similar to the NIST
test suite, but NIST is considered the most comprehensive [58].
Figure 26 in the appendix shows the NIST test application
software used for testing the OTP binary sequence.
D. Entropy and Information
Entropy quantifies the randomness of a cipher and Shannon
and Szilard showed how information and unpredictability are
connected. The French Carnot family named entropy as the
portion of energy which cannot do useful work in a system
[59], and the German physicist, Rudolf Clausius, defined
entropy S as the ratio of the heat in a system Q to its
temperature T as S = QT . Ludwig Boltzmann formed his
kinetic theory of gases and said in any closed system entropy
will always increase and is a measure of the dispersal of energy
FIGURE 14. (A) THE LENA IMAGE (B) HISTOGRAM OF UNENCODED
IMAGE (C) POWER SPECTRAL DENSITY OF UNENCODED IMAGE.
S = kB logW with kB = 1.3806x10−23 Joules/K. Here,
W is the equiprobable number of microstates with the same
dimension as entropy. According to Boltzmann’s hypothesis,
a logarithmic relationship exists between entropy, phase space
volume, kB , and the macroscopic and microscopic states of
gas [60].
A famous thought experiment by James Clerk Maxwell
called Maxwell’s Demon, created a paradox [61] on the
entropy of gas particles in a closed system. Szilard described
a sealed box containing hot and cold gas particles and a gate
operated by a devil who could separate the hot and cold gas
particles without expending energy.
Leo Szilard proposed a solution by associating information
with entropy, because each time the demon operated the gate
he collected information. Szilard argued the information bal-
anced the overall entropy and solved the paradox. In Szilard’s
doctoral dissertation (1922), and a companion paper 1929 [62],
he stated there was an increase of klog2 units of entropy in any
measurement. Later, Shannon and Kolmogorov independently
argued the case for a link between information and entropy.
E. Shannon Entropy
Claude Shannon discussed the relationship between entropy
and information in his 1949 paper [30] and related this to
the randomness of a signal. Shannon defined entropy as a
measure of the amount of information to determine precisely a
system state from among all possible states. Thus, the Shannon
information content in binary digits, or ‘bits’, for an outcome,
x, for a random sequence, X, with n outcomes, x1,x2.....xn,
is h(x) = ln 1p(xi) . A measure of uncertainty for a string of
length n, is the average Shannon entropy:
H(x) = −
n∑
i=1
p(xi) ln p(xi) bits (12)
The probability that an event xi occurs from the number of
states n, is p(xi), with each state having a probability between
0 and 1. The log of the probability yields 0 to negative infinity,
but because entropy is positive a negative sign in (12) is
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introduced. Boltzmann and Shannon entropy equations have
opposite signs and a scaling factor, -kln2. Shannon entropy
sorts objects into N bins of size ni and measures the amount
of information required to determine precisely a system state
from all possible states. The higher the entropy of a signal, the
greater the amount of information and is, therefore, a measure
of signal unpredictability or randomness.
F. Kolmogorov entropy and Algorithmic Complexity
The Russian mathematician, Andrei Kolmogorov suggested
in 1959, a modified form of the Shannon entropy, as did
Y.Sinai in the same year, hence it is known as the Kolmogorov-
Sinai (KS) entropy and is an essential metric for testing the
randomness of a chaotic series. For example, KS entropy is
zero for a regular series, finite for a chaotic series, but infinite
for a random signal [18]. Shannon and KS entropy represents
the rate at which information is created and defines when a
time series is chaotic.
From an observer’s resolution, the partition is, β =
{X1, X2, ..., Xm}, and examining the system state, x, the
observer determines only the fact that x ∈ Xi and can re-
construct the symbolic trajectory αn = {sm1 , sm2 , . . . , smn}
corresponding to the regions visited. The entropy of a trajec-
tory αn, with respect to the partition β, is given by
Hβn = −
∑
αn
Pr (αn) log|A| Pr (αn) (13)
where Pr (αn) is the probability of occurrence of the substring,
αn. The conditional entropy of the (n+1)-th symbol provided
the previous n symbols are known, is defined as:
hβn = h
β
n+1|n =
{
Hβn+1 −Hβn , n ≥ 1
Hβ1 , n = 1
(14)
The entropy for a partition, β, is given by
hβ = lim
n→∞h
β
n = lim
n→∞
1
n
Hβn
The KS entropy of a chaotic system is the supremum over all
possible partitions.
hKS = sup
β
hβ (15)
The KS entropy is zero for regular systems, finite and
positive for a deterministic chaos, but infinite for a random
process. It is related to the Lyapunov exponents by hKS =∑
1≤d≤D λd, and proportional to the time horizon T on which
the system is predictable. An important metric in cryptography
which also measure randomness is the Kolmogorov Com-
plexity (KC) created simultaneously by Kolmogorov and Ray
Solmonoff but essentially is the Shannon entropy. KC specifies
the minimum length to which a binary string of bits may
be compressed (a truly random sequence is incompressible)
[63]. A positive KS entropy is proof of chaotic behaviour and
randomness and related to algorithmic complexity, where the
system is ergodic. We may relate complexity and entropy as
“cause and effect”- the more complex a system is, the more
unpredictable its behaviour is and results in higher entropy.
Complexity is considered the size of an “internal program”
that generates a binary sequence, whereas entropy is computed
from the probability distribution of that sequence.
G. Probability Distribution Function-Histograms
A Probability Distribution Function (PDF) is defined as a
function from strings L = {αj}, to nonnegative real numbers,
i.e., Pr : L → [0, 1], such that ∑α∈L Pr (α) = 1. A string
α is truly random if, for any substring βn, γn ∈ α, 0 > n >
length(α) Pr(βn) = Pr(γn). We cannot predict any digit in a
truly random string, i.e., for any symbol si ∈ α, the conditional
probability Pr(si|si−1, si−2, . . .) = Pr(si). A knowledge of a
previous state has no effect on the probability of a successful
prediction of the next state.
H. Lyapunov Exponential
The Lyapunov Exponent (LE) quantifies how chaotic tra-
jectory orbits diverge with time and must be positive for the
function to generate chaotic trajectories within a few iterations.
The LE measures how fast two chaotic paths separate from
each other, i.e., predicting the behaviour of a chaotic system
in time. However, this measure has the disadvantage in that
it does not consider the resolution under which the system is
observed, unlike KS entropy [64][65]. Entropy and LE’s in a
chaotic system are approximately equal, and Pesin’s theorem
relates KS as the sum of positive LE’s.
I. The average entropy test
Averaging the Lorenz x signal is a novel and quick test for
assessing how parameter variation changes the randomness of
the binary stream. A truly random signal should oscillate close
to zero, but if it displays more positive than negative excur-
sions around the zero axis, then the signal is biased. Figure 15
shows four plots for each value of C5 and demonstrates how
the delay changes the average value of the Lorenz X signal.
FIGURE 15. EFFECT OF C5 ON THE X SIGNAL ENTROPY.
The delay is changed by varying Cd or Rd, and observing
the value which brought the average signal closest to the zero
axis. In the prototype, the resistance, Rd was chosen as the
variable parameter as it was the easier option. Averaging a
non-random sequence of alternating ones and zeroes would
also be plotted closest to the zero axis but the method is useful
nevertheless for assessing the presence of bias. A positive start-
up transient part can be observed in the average of x in Figure
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16 and means the stream is biased. This necessitated rejecting
the start-up transient region by the software. Figure 17 and
Figure 18 show the effect of changing Lorenz parameters on
the average value.
FIGURE 16. AVERAGE x FOR 0.5 US DELAY
FIGURE 17. AVERAGE x FOR P = 11
FIGURE 18. AVERAGE x FOR LORENZ AND CHUA PARAMETERS.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Inadequate Cloud security for sensitive data stored in the
Cloud was addressed by creating an extra layer of localised
encoding using a truly random binary number OTP generator
to return control to the client. Local encryption could reduce or
eliminate, fines against companies and organisations who fail
to meet the 72-hour breach deadline notification as outlined
in the 2018 GDPR legislation. The proposed OTP encoder
generates binary sequences from analogue chaos signals hav-
ing an infinite number of states and overcome the difficulties
associated with a digital implementation of an OTP which uses
finite-state arithmetic and not truly random.
An analogue delay was added to the feedback paths of
the Lorenz and Chua analogue oscillators to increase the
OTP entropy in a novel way. Chaos sources initialised by
noise from a data receiver generated truly random unlimited
amounts of unbreakable binary sequences that passed the NIST
statistical suite of tests. A novel testing method was developed
to investigate the effect of specific parameter variation on
entropy. This simple, quick test involved observing the signal
average and selected the parameter which caused the average
to oscillate close to the zero time axis. A JavaScript application
post-processed the OTP sequences by applying a VN algorithm
which maximised the sequence entropy and then combined it
with the plaintext data.
A prototype printed circuit board (PCB) was tested for
randomness, but future work is being planned to imple-
ment the final encoder on a Programmable System-on-Chip
(PSoC) family of microcontroller integrated circuits [66].
Other planned work involves localised encryption for devices
used to protect local devices used in the Internet of Things
(IoT), which is growing at a fast pace and has very little
security at present.
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APPENDIX
Figure 19 shows noise voltage initial conditions produce
a different trajectory in the strange attractor for each noise
level. This mechanism makes cryptanalysis difficult because
the random nature of electronic noise produces a different
value each time it is sampled.
FIGURE 19. A 30D LORENZ ATTRACTOR INITIALISED BY NOISE.
Figure 20 plots a Poincare´ section placed through the FPs
of the attractor.
FIGURE 20. 3-D PLOT OF LORENZ ATTRACTOR.
Scaling Lorenz signals is necessary because the amplitude
of the unscaled z signal shown in Figure 21 is too large at 45
V for normal electronic operation electronic implementation.
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FIGURE 21. THE SCALED THE LORENZ Z SIGNAL IS IN THE LOWER PANE.
The ABM Chua circuit in Figure 22 allowed concepts to be
simulated quickly and without the convergence problems of
model integrated circuits. The nonlinear Chua chaos parame-
ters are different to the previous values used. The ABM SUM,
MULT, INTEG, and GAIN parts implement mathematical
arithmetical functions, with a PARAM part to define any
variables used.
FIGURE 22. A CHUA ABM CHAOS OSCILLATOR
FIGURE 23. AN AUTOCORRELATION PLOT OF A POLAR NOISE SIGNAL.
The autocorrelation plots for noise and the OTP in Figure
23 shows an impulse on a triangle which is caused by the DC
of a polar OTP.
Removing the average DC will display the classic impulse
autocorrelation shaped response. Figure 24 shows the Lorenz
out-of-phase set and reset signal pulses from the LM339
comparator and have different widths at each sampling time
but are made to have a constant width using the monostable
devices. External resistor-capacitor components connected to
the monostable set the width of the binary pulses to a con-
stant value. The process of producing binary signals from an
analogue source is a 1-bit ADC.
FIGURE 24. OUTPUT SET AND RESET SIGNALS FROM THE COMPARATOR.
Figure 25 illustrates how bias in the random string shows up
as regular patterns in the encoded picture. This should never be
allowed as any bias reduces the robustness of the OTP against
attacks.
FIGURE 25. BIAS IN THE ENCODED PICTURE.
Figure 26 shows the application used to evaluate the ran-
domness of the OTP. The parameterised tests need certain
parameters inputted, as shown in the parameter boxes on the
right-hand-side.
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